In an attempt to spur such efforts, in 2004 Ronald Hutton proposed a tentative list of five basic characteristics that would apply to witches and witchcraft across the world and throughout history. Among these was that witches ''harm neighbors or kin rather than strangers.'' 4 Geschiere builds on this point, taking a discrete characteristic and turning it into a defining feature by arguing that witchcraft is essentially about a universal human paradox; namely, that the group of people with whom we are most intimate has, by virtue of that intimacy, tremendous power and a potentially ''dangerous hold'' over us. 5 The remedy for this danger is trust, but when trust fails, witchcraft appears. Geschiere's analysis is too subtle to sum up so easily, but over the course of his book he convincingly shows how issues of intimacy and trust underlie a range of beliefs, practices, and fears that it then makes increasing sense to see as a unified, global phenomenon of witchcraft.
While Geschiere's analysis is grounded in Africa, for the obvious reason that this is the area of his greatest expertise, his full scope is broad indeed, encompassing Europe, Latin America, Southeast Asia, and Oceania. He offers useful insights and interesting provocations at almost every turn. From my perspective, one of his most effective although indirect provocations is tacitly to urge those of us who focus on European history to stop seeing Europe as some kind of grand metropole of witchcraft, around which all other witchcrafts of the world cluster as dependent colonies. Geschiere does not declare this position at any point in his book, and sensibly he does not waste time trumpeting the need for the subaltern (a term he never employs) to be taken seriously in its own right. Instead, he simply recognizes that the rich scholarship available on witchcraft in Africa and increasingly in other parts of the world allows for comparisons that include Europe but do not privilege it in any way. Proceeding from that basis, he develops a comparative conversation much richer than just a simple dialogue between Africa and Europe, or indeed between any two regions of the globe.
Because Geschiere is so broad-minded in his own approach, I feel only slight trepidation that my reactions to his book in fact focus to a large extent on Europe (for the obvious reason that this is the region of my greatest expertise). What follows here is less a full review of Witchcraft, Intimacy, and Trust than a consideration of what possibilities its comparative framework reveals for the study of witchcraft on a global scale and what insights its wide-ranging approach can yield for those of us who, while we are eager to take part in global conversations, are still fixated on the sliver of the world known as Western Europe. My focus will fall, first, on the basic problem of defining witchcraft, especially across different cultures. Scholars interested in promoting comparative work have long struggled with the fact that ''there is no general agreement on what a witch or witchcraft is supposed to be,'' and arguments about terminology have driven a wedge especially between the study of witchcraft in Europe and the rest of the world.
6 I want to suggest, however, that as witchcraft studies in Europe expand their focus, the need to adopt a more flexible and fluid approach to terms and definitions, which Geschiere promotes for Africa and elsewhere, becomes increasingly apparent. In particular, his use of intimacy as a defining or at least delimiting feature of witchcraft demonstrates how European history, including its seemingly unique movement toward a supposedly disenchanted modernity, can be integrated successfully into broader frameworks. Following this, I turn to matters of trust, which Geschiere sees as instrumental in the growth or decline of anxiety about witchcraft in any given culture. After summarizing his arguments, which focus on South America and Southeast Asia, I will again return to Europe, because I think his approach suggests an interesting possibility for how concern about witchcraft was long kept in check in Western European culture, perhaps breathing new life into an old argument famously associated with Keith Thomas.
CONTAINING THE WITCH
Witchcraft can be a difficult term to define precisely, especially across different cultures and historical contexts. Various universal definitions that have been offered over time have all eventually proven inadequate in some way or unacceptable to some group. Geschiere addresses this problem directly but not with any concise formula of his own. Rather, he suggests ways of delimiting the meaning of witchcraft without strictly defining it, in order to ''contain the term'' and ''avoid confirming sweeping generalizations about witchcraft's omnipresence,'' while still allowing for ''the shifting quality of witchcraft discourse that is so important to its power.'' 7 By doing so, he helps to dissolve a barrier that has not only impeded the global study of witchcraft but that has also stood particularly intransigently between anthropologists and 6. Hutton, ''Anthropological and Historical Approaches,'' 418-20, quote at 420; see also Behringer, Witches and Witch-Hunts, 3-7.
7. WIT, 13.
historians for several decades. A brief history of Europe's initial engagement with and then withdrawal from comparative witchcraft studies will frame the problem, before we turn to Geschiere's solution and how it can serve to incorporate Europe's unique historical trajectory, in terms of anxiety about witchcraft, into a workable global scheme. It is well known that the surge of historical studies focused on early modern European witchcraft that began in the late 1960s and early 1970s was inspired, in part, by comparative impulses, as scholars such as Alan Macfarlane and Keith Thomas sought to incorporate methods and conclusions drawn from African anthropology into their arguments. 8 But cracks would soon appear in this cooperative scholarly exchange, mainly because of issues of definition. In an exchange published in 1975, anthropologist Hildred Geertz challenged Thomas for, as she saw it, carelessly shifting his key terminology, sometimes deploying ''magic,'' ''religion,'' and ''witchcraft'' as they were understood in the modern world and sometimes as they were understood by people living in sixteenth-and seventeenth-century England. 9 Thomas responded that this was precisely his point. He did not regard these terms as fixed categories. Instead, he was trying to trace their change over time, in order to show how the early modern European understanding of magic shifted into the modern one. In conclusion, he declared that, because of divergent views of how to treat basic categories and terminology, increasingly structuralist anthropology was no longer compatible with history. 10 Historians, in the main, followed the course that Thomas charted.
11 Pulling back from comparative approaches, as he predicted, they were less troubled by the potentially slippery meaning of terms like ''magic'' or ''witchcraft'' because they were generally concerned (or thought of themselves as being concerned) only with what those words meant in particular contexts.
12 As Geertz had observed, however, and as Thomas never quite fully resolved, magic and witchcraft represent both first-order terms, used by ordinary people in specific historical situations, and second-order terms of academic categorization that inevitably and sometimes deliberately do not map fully onto historical usages. 13 Historians obscured this dilemma in part by tacitly privileging the main historical context on which they focused: witchcraft in Western Europe from the fifteenth through eighteenth centuries, and, even more narrowly, witchcraft as it was constructed in the major trials and demonological literature of this era. Definitions that were drawn faithfully enough from these particular contexts were then redeployed all too readily as natural categories. The problem is that such definitions never captured all the possible meanings of witchcraft, even in Europe, let alone elsewhere.
Given the privileged place of early modern witchcraft within European history, it is not surprising that debates about terminology reemerged most clearly in studies focused on periods at the greatest remove from this imperial center. One of the most radical propositions remains that of David Frankfurter, a scholar of ancient religion, who has suggested that we dispense entirely with terms like magician, witch, or priest as uselessly inexact and unstable, and reposition all the ''ritual experts'' of antiquity into new boxes of our own more rational devising. We would parse them, for example, according to whether they were fully integrated within or peripheral to their communities, whether they were associated with established institutions (temple sites or fixed intellectual traditions) or operated in a more ''freelance'' manner, or whether they were perceived as beneficial to their society or as enemies.
14 This proposal has not been widely adopted, but for a time many scholars of Western antiquity shied away from rendering words such as goeteia or maleficium as ''witchcraft,'' because they felt that such translations failed to capture and in fact often occluded ancient meanings. 15 original-language terminology, or they employed more precise modern terminology for specific kinds of practice: divination, binding spell, curse tablet, and so forth. More recently the ''pendulum'' in ancient studies appears to have ''swung back in the other direction,'' however, partly due to recognition of the fact that the ancients themselves did not always employ terminology precisely and often clustered practices together in loose and unstable ways. 16 Historians of late medieval and early modern Europe are, with less overt theorizing, moving toward a similar conclusion. After years of defining witchcraft mainly in terms of the highly diabolized stereotypes derived from trials and treatises during the era of the major witch hunts, they are now becoming more comfortable with the fact that there was never really any single stereotype, single impetus for persecution, or indeed single kind of witch. 17 There can be no doubt that concerns about the intensely demonic, conspiratorially subversive nature of witchcraft shared by many authorities across Western Europe heaped much kindling onto the pyres of the witch hunts. Equally clear, however, is that the major hunts and the particular ideas of witchcraft that crystallized within them are not the sole defining characteristic of what witchcraft was in these years. 18 Moreover, as we have long known, the diabolical witch never had the same resonance in Europe's Orthodox East as it had in the Catholic/Protestant West.
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All these developments point to the fact that (Western) European witchcraft should not be placed in any privileged position in which terms and categories of analysis are thought somehow to align more naturally and 16. Stratton, Naming the Witch, 9-11, quote at 9. 17. Summing up the current state of scholarship is Brain P. Levack unproblematically than in other contexts, least of all because some early modern vernacular terms happen to be the same as those used by scholars today. The devil-worshipping, sabbath-going women appearing in some early modern records really have no better claim to the analytical abstraction ''witch'' than do certain malefic figures from earlier pagan legend or those who continued to be suspected by their neighbors of wicked magical practices after the witch hunts had subsided. Of course, this realization can also lead to the argument that if witchcraft has never been a stable or strictly definable category even within European history, then it can never serve as a meaningful category for global comparisons. Here is where Geschiere's approach to matters of definition shows its merit.
He begins with the practical point that witchcraft is not just a second-order academic category. It is a first-order term that many people around the world use to describe their beliefs, practices, or experiences. 20 This assertion is not restricted to the English word witchcraft, and it is not just a matter of forced translations or the imposition of European concepts. The Maka in Cameroon, for example, now automatically use sorcellerie to convey their concept of djambe when speaking French, and sometimes even use sorcellerie when they are speaking in their native language, having made that word their own.
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Something may get lost, even for a Cameroonian, in the translation of djambe to sorcellerie, and some confusion may intrude when a Cameroonian Francophone uses the word sorcellerie with another French-speaker. Geschiere notes an uncomfortable moment when, in 2009, after delivering a conference paper at a university in Cameroon, an audience member asked a question that included homosexuality as one of several ''forms of sorcellerie,'' while Geschiere himself would never conflate these concepts. 22 This serves to introduce his main point, that just as there can be slippages of meaning between djambe and sorcellerie so there are slippages, uncertainties, and even outright contradictions within these words themselves. The act of translation, therefore, is fraught but not unwarranted, and it is in fact this ambiguity common across various terms that provides some coherence.
Academics generally strive for precision of language in our categories of analysis. Accordingly, when Geschiere first studied witchcraft in Cameroon, he began to compile a sizeable archive of note cards on which he recorded all the uses he encountered of djambe, trying to find ''unequivocal distinctions''
between different kinds of practice contained within that fluid term. 23 If historians of European witchcraft lack similar experiences, it is only because our main sources-trial records and demonological treatises-have already done some of the work for us, ''translating-or, rather, transposing-beliefs fundamentally foreign to them into another, more unambiguous code.'' 24 We try to eliminate any remaining uncertainties or contradictions through source criticism. But for Geschiere, our goal of clarity and precision represents a fundamentally flawed approach to our topic. He contends that part of the meaning and power of witchcraft, in any language, is that it is ''secret and opposed to transparency.'' 25 This view has been articulated by a number of scholars working across Africa and in other parts of the world. 26 In Witchcraft, Intimacy, and Trust, Geschiere builds on their insights and his own earlier postulation that if one really wants to understand witchcraft, ''the academic principle of clarity [may be] an obstacle rather than an asset.'' 27 Witchcraft, then, is inherently ambiguous, mysterious, and occult. These are not barriers to proper understanding that need to be overcome; they are an essential aspect of the phenomenon itself. Everyone who engages with witchcraft-those who practice it, those who feel its effects in their lives, those former (and current) magistrates who seek to punish it, and scholars who seek to study it-all find themselves engaged in a ''struggle for clarity in a minefield of ambiguities and slippages.'' 28 Practitioners, prosecutors, and victims each have their own (imperfect) solutions to this problem. For scholars, Geschiere does not suggest that we abandon any kind of critical or rigorous stance. One of his central concerns in Witchcraft, Intimacy, and Trust is to suggest a way-which he never claims to be the only way-for scholars to approach the topic of witchcraft with some coherence, without constricting its inherent ambiguities but also without allowing it to become ''omnipresent,'' that is, a completely malleable category into which any content can be poured. 29 His motivation stems very much from the current situation in Africa, where concepts of witchcraft have metastasized at a fantastic rate in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, in response to the rapid social and cultural changes that modernity has brought to much of the continent. His solution is to emphasize the links between the varieties of occult aggression and harm (and also the potentially helpful and protective power) loosely conceived as witchcraft and the realms of intimacy and trust associated especially in Africa with the household, also loosely construed. He does not arrive at any fixed definition. In this way, his approach is an important advance on Ronald Hutton's concise observation, mentioned above, that a witch ''works to harm neighbors or kin rather than strangers.'' 30 The point is not to define witchcraft, in the usual sense, or even to impute a set characteristic to it, but rather to contain it within a certain field of action.
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Having introduced this framework of containment in his first chapter, Geschiere spends the rest of the book demonstrating its utility, and a number of insights emerge about witchcraft in different contexts. In the remainder of this section, I will highlight one that is very important to Geschiere, namely, why witchcraft has survived and indeed flourished in contemporary African societies, whereas of course according to the traditional model derived from European history it should be in the process of dwindling away in the face of advancing modernity. His solution is particularly elegant because it provincializes Europe in a very positive way. Instead of simply declaring Europe to be different from Africa, something more than enough European historians have done in their studies of witchcraft, he creates a framework that reincorporates Europe into his global scheme, explaining its unique development without rendering it a complete exception.
A great deal of scholarship focused on Africa, on other regions of the non-Western world, and on the West itself, has addressed the relationship of witchcraft to modernity, and it has been amply demonstrated that there is no essential incompatibility between the two. 32 The question remains open, however, as to why modernity in the West supports such a different level of generalized belief in and prevalent anxiety about witchcraft than is evident in so many other parts of the globe. Obviously, there are innumerable particular answers, but perhaps the most typical overarching response, and one that is certainly sensible precisely because it allows for all those particularities, is that modernity takes different forms and creates varying conditions in different contexts. 33 In that system, however, the concept of modernity itself tends to lose any real utility, which some might regard as a blessing, but which would also close one broad avenue for global comparison. 34 Geschiere sidesteps this issue by offering a framework that is both fluid and stable.
A subset of the argument that modernity destroys witchcraft is that in traditional societies witchcraft serves to express tensions within very localized settings. In Africa, it flourished within kinship groups comprised of people who generally lived in close proximity to one another. In Europe, certainly for the heavily studied period of the early modern witch trials, it flared among neighbors living in small village communities. Even though the notion of witchcraft as expressive of social tensions was borrowed by European historians from African anthropologists in the 1970s, 35 it was in fact the condition more intrinsically characteristic of Europe-physical proximity rather than consanguineous relationship-that weighed more heavily on subsequent interpretations. When modernity disrupted traditional societies of small rural communities by introducing advanced technologies of communication and by luring sons and daughters away to growing urban centers (so the argument went), it naturally ended or at least severely reduced belief in witchcraft. Perplexingly (in this view), in Africa witchcraft beliefs persisted in rural communities but also in major urban centers, and new varieties of witchcraft One can accommodate these supposed peculiarities by adding all sorts of addendums to long-standing frameworks for understanding witchcraft, but Geschiere instead simplifies. He expands his notion of intimacy from the (tacitly Eurocentric) notion of physical proximity to any kind of closeness, any demarcation between what is ''inside'' and what is ''outside. '' 37 In Europe, where networks of kinship obviously existed but where the nuclear family had, by the time of the major witch trials, long since become the dominant familial grouping, an important degree of intimacy was extended not to more distant kin but to neighbors, thereby creating a context in which the dynamics of witchcraft could be significantly disrupted by the physical dislocations of modernity. In Africa, important levels of intimacy adhered to extended kinship no matter the degree of physical proximity. Thus dynamics of witchcraft more easily persisted and adapted to changing times, regardless of whether members of those kin groups remained in small rural villages, moved to expanding urban centers, or even (in some of the most interesting examples Geschiere cites) moved abroad.
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By allowing his containing concept of intimacy to become more fluid than just locality, which would exclude Africa, or blood-relations per se, which would exclude Europe, Geschiere allows for the variability of witchcraft in different contexts, and for understanding the different trajectories its flux has taken, but still manages to assert an underlying connection across contexts. He admits that, in trying to contain one slippery concept with another, he risks a certain ''methodological circularity'': to some extent relying on witchcraft rumors and anxieties as his chief indicator of what people regard as an ''intimate'' group while also advocating intimacy as his chief criterion for when fears of hidden aggression and occult threat should be labeled ''witchcraft.'' 39 The approach is not intellectually invulnerable. But as Geschiere applies it to actual cases in the course of his analysis, it seems very useful.
Related to the connection he sees between witchcraft and intimacy is the opposition Geschiere posits between witchcraft and trust. In the second half of this article, I want to test the utility of this other major component of his framework, both in contexts to which he dedicates significant attention and in some to which he does not. If Geschiere is right that intimacy gone awry is one of the most important features of witchcraft, delimiting the phenomenon if not defining it, then an important counterforce against the fear of witches would be trust. Witchcraft prevails in situations where trust should reign but does not. Fluctuations of trust within intimate groups should therefore be linkable to fluctuations in the intensity of concern about witches in a wide variety of settings. Geschiere tests this proposition mainly in South America and Southeast Asia. I will suggest that it might be applied usefully to Europe as well. This will again entail provincializing that continent, since the spectacular rise and even more so the subsequent decline of witchcraft and witch-hunting from the fourteenth to the eighteenth centuries have traditionally been presented as a major part of Europe's supposedly unique historical trajectory leading to disenchanted modernity. There is no need to rehearse here all the ways in which scholarship has complicated that simple story, reaffirming the place of magic and questioning the level of modernity in the Renaissance, Reformation, Scientific Revolution, and even Enlightenment. 40 Despite these revisions of the traditional narrative of Western progress, however, Europe and the West are still generally studied separately from the rest of the world in terms of processes of enchantment and disenchantment, and certainly in terms of the rise and decline of witchcraft. 41 Geschiere himself refrains from examining the notion of trust in a European context, which is why I want to push his paradigm in that direction here.
To begin, it is important to differentiate Geschiere's emphasis on cultures of trust serving as a check on growing fear of witches from similar arguments that might focus on general levels of political, social, and economic security. One might well ask: does it matter if a villager trusts her neighbor or a kinsman trusts his cousin, so long as their immediate worlds are relatively stable and secure? Or alternately, if one's world is reasonably stable and secure, will one not likely be more inclined to remain trustful of a neighbor or relative, 41. Sanders, Deed Without a Name (as above, n. 3), develops a global theory that witchcraft accusations become more severe when control of wealth or power is involved, and works to fit European diabolical witchcraft into this pattern (at p. 144), but his argument is not entirely convincing either for Europe or the globe. even if something occasionally goes wrong and certain anxieties about possible occult forces are stirred? Geschiere addresses such questions most directly by looking at the violence against suspected witches that erupted in Java in the wake of the collapse of the Suharto regime in 1998 and 1999, mainly as studied by the anthropologist James Siegel. 42 Geschiere recognizes that other scholars have differed from Siegel in their interpretation of these events, presenting them as relatively straightforward examples of anxieties about witchcraft spiking in moments of general social stress, but this is precisely the approach he wants to counter. 43 Siegel himself argues that other anthropologists (and the historians who have borrowed from them) have long misunderstood witchcraft in a purely functionalist manner as an expression of social tension and witch-hunting as a pressure valve for the resolution or at least reduction of those tensions. 44 In his analysis, witchcraft relates only indirectly to social tension or conflicts of any kind. He argues, in fact, that neither Suharto's ''New Order'' nor its collapse wrought much change at the level of local village society where witchcraft fears manifested. 45 What the end of Suharto's rule did unleash was a wave of ''suspicion'' across the country, so that once-familiar aspects of people's lives now appeared strange and ''uncanny. '' 46 ''Naming the witch'' served to restore mental and emotional balance, to ''normalize the uncanny,'' irrespective of whether actual social conditions improved or conflicts were resolved. 47 Geschiere's analysis is too short and Siegel's argument too challenging to provide a completely clear case of the utility of trust in explaining the rise or decline of fears about witchcraft. 48 It is certainly suggestive, however; I immediately thought of how it might apply to the well-known conundrum in the history of European witchcraft that, even in times of heightened concern, by no means all negative events were blamed on witches. Illness, injury, death, crop failure, infertility, or inclement weather had to be perceived as in some way unusual or extreme (''uncanny,'' in Siegel's formulation) in order to spark accusations. On the other hand, as is well known from European studies, large-scale outbreaks of anti-witch violence (i.e., hunts) regularly involved multiple factors-social, legal, and political, beyond just the cultural-such that any singular explanation will inevitably be lacking in some respect. 49 This does not negate the use Geschiere makes of Siegel's work, but more convincing evidence comes from elsewhere.
Geschiere develops his argument for the role of trust in mitigating fears associated with witchcraft most fully through his comparison of African dynamics to those surrounding Brazilian Candomblé. A syncretic religion of African extraction, Candomblé is akin to Vodou or Santería. It has long been associated with feitiçaria (sorcery), not just by Portuguese colonial elites but also by postcolonial elites and many ordinary people as well. Its power has generally been regarded as deeply ambiguous, and it has been perceived as a source of great threat as well as help and protection. 50 Comparing this to his knowledge of Cameroonian djambe, Geschiere describes how ''familiar for me was the kind of balancing act that these healers had to manage'' when he first encountered present-day practitioners in the Sertão region of the Brazilian state of Bahia. 51 Many differences also pertain, however, none greater than the fact that Candomblé has developed into a recognized religion with an established structure. In addition to local healers and suspected harmful witches, among its practitioners are an organized priesthood of mães de santo and (generally less important and revered) pais de santo operating out of temple-centers (terreiros).
Geschiere argues that historically these temples functioned, in part, to replace the kinship communities that were shattered by the experience of slavery, and that they continue to operate according to quasi-familial forms today. For example, mãi and pai de santo mean ''mother'' and ''father of saint,'' respectively, while novices are referred to as daughters and sons. Although this ersatz intimacy could have gestated the same kind of distrust that Geschiere sees promoting fear of witches in Africa, he postulates that instead ''the status of these temples as clearly delineated and more or less permanent institutions may have facilitated the inclusion of representations of dangerous forces in a broader religious discourse that facilitated establishing trust. ' While negative occult forces and practitioners exist within the system of Candomblé, Geschiere finds that people in Brazil are much less concerned with identifying and punishing witches than is the case in Africa, although they will seek healing or protection if they believe that they have been assaulted by feitiçaria.
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While I am in no real position to judge Geschiere's reading of the social history of Brazil, his views about Candomblé appear to be confirmed by the effects of certain recent Pentecostal efforts against it. As they have done with traditional religious systems in Africa, Pentecostal preachers have asserted that the spirits of Candomblé are in fact demons and that its rites serve only the devil. 54 More telling, though, is that Pentecostals in Brazil often focus on linking Candomblé temples to urban crime, thus positioning them as inherently untrustworthy places. Some evidence indicates that this is often a successful maneuver, reviving concerns among practitioners about the ambiguous and potentially sinister nature of the spirits.
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On the other hand, a partial challenge to Geschiere's analysis might be raised by the case of Haiti. There recent work has stressed how, despite concerted efforts on the part of successive governments-French colonial, independent Haitian, and U.S. occupation-as well as the Catholic Church to cast la vaudoux as sortilège, most ordinary Haitians retained an essential faith in Vodou as a beneficial and basically trustworthy system through which to access sometimes ambiguous spirits. Their ''trust'' does not seem to have depended on Vodou practitioners operating within permanent structures or other trappings of organized religion, since these were outlawed for most of Haitian history. 56 Still, whether permanent structures are essential or not in all cases, one can see in Haiti as well as Brazil how a basic level of trust in a system for confronting and engaging with occult spiritual forces (which practitioners readily admit have their dark and threatening sides) could be a factor working to restrain the sort of rampant anxieties about occult threat that all too frequently characterize systems of witchcraft. 57 Geschiere focuses his analysis of trust and its effects on the workings of witchcraft almost entirely on Brazil and Java, although he suggests many 57. Geschiere (WIT, 181) states that Vodou would fit his system, I presume more or less in the way I suggest here.
other cases would also conform to his model. Here I want to explore whether the history of witchcraft in Europe and North America provides examples that would support his basic argument. Are there contexts in which people engaging with ambiguous and potentially threatening occult forces have operated within some form of ''religious'' structure that augments levels of trust within the community and so puts a check on spiraling fears about witchcraft?
The most obvious examples might seem to come from the modern period. The preeminent case of a self-declared religion that engages, by its own definition, with magic is modern neo-pagan witchcraft, also known as Wicca. Geschiere asserts that it would fit his paradigm, but he does not clarify how.
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Modern witches clearly comprise a kind of intimate community. Although many practitioners operate individually, the movement as a whole provides a form of group identity in its deliberately ''alternative'' status. Witchcraft is still an extremely young religion, and so it remains a deliberately chosen identity for most of its practitioners, who often come to it in their teenage years, rather than a community that determines membership based on biology or geography. 59 When modern witches do practice together or gather for other purposes, their rites and celebrations almost always place a premium on intimacy and trust, and they generally engage with occult forces, or believe themselves to do so, with a high degree of confidence. A problem with incorporating them into Geschiere's analysis, however, would seem to be that they do not usually regard the occult forces with which they engage as very ambiguous. While they believe that magic can be used for negative purposes, this is typically conceived as a gross misuse of power that will rebound against the practitioner threefold. 60 In the face of sometimes significant suspicion and hostility from others-that they do regularly perform harmful magic, that they engage in satanic rituals, that they abuse or sacrifice children-many modern witches are understandably committed to the position that their engagement with the supernatural or paranormal is unambiguously positive and beneficial. Another possible test case might be the religiomagical or at least magicalspiritual occult societies that flourished in Europe and the United States in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Seeking to spice up their Victorian or Edwardian lives, the mostly solid bourgeoisie members of these groups were not shy about stressing the ambiguous, potentially dangerous nature of the forces with which they engaged. The famous figure of Aleister Crowley is often allowed to stand in for the darker and more hedonistic elements of these movements as a whole, although he is as much an extraordinary figure as he is a representative one. 62 Despite the various mysteries entailed in their practices, however, perhaps the most interesting ''ambiguities'' with which modern occultists engaged lay not in their ritual systems or hermetic communities but in the larger cultural setting of European modernity, of which they were both members and critics. 63 While there might be interesting lines of investigation to pursue here following Geschiere's insights, I suspect that the relatively short-lived nature of most of these groups would prove a fundamental obstacle. The intimacy they possessed was quite artificial and could be easily dissolved if tensions grew too great (as they often did within these frequently contentious organizations).
Rather than any modern group that explicitly attributes a religious or spiritual character to magical practice, the most compelling case from Western history that might demonstrate the utility of Geschiere's assertions about the function of trust in relation to fear of witchcraft could well be the medieval church. This may seem shocking, given that historians of European magic and witchcraft have heaped more than a little disdain on arguments surrounding what Keith Thomas characterized as ''the magic of the medieval church.'' This was how he labeled the wide range of rites and rituals that for centuries prior to the Reformation the church in Western Europe had offered to Christians as a mechanism through which they could invoke and employ occult power not just for the salvation of their souls but for health, protection from misfortune, and defense against malevolent occult attack and the threat of witchcraft. 64 According to his argument, concern about witchcraft mounted and witch hunts became far more frequent when Protestantism, which focused more exclusively on spiritual salvation rather than mechanistic rites to garner divine help and protection in this world, disrupted this system. People still believed in and sought to manipulate a broad spectrum of occult forces, turning for professional guidance now more often to local cunningfolk who offered to perform healings, divinations, and other services, but in an inherently less structured and more ambiguous context than had earlier been provided by village priests.
Geschiere notes the potential ambiguity of early modern cunning-folk in a brief reference to Thomas, but he does not engage with his larger argument or with any criticism subsequently leveled against it, of which there has been more than a little. 65 Historians of medieval Europe have argued that referring to church rites as ''magic'' profoundly distorts the strict dichotomy that Christianity had laid over the spiritual universe, in which magic was always understood as the harmful or at least deceptive work of the devil and thus was fundamentally different from manifestations of divine power that church rites might provoke. 66 Early modern historians also joined the fray, noting that Protestantism in no way ''disenchanted'' Europe and in fact had its own mechanisms, albeit less elaborate than Catholicism's, through which the faithful could access divine power for practical protection and comfort here on earth. 67 While the clerical hierarchy of all Christian denominations stressed a strict separation of magic from religion, however, there is every indication that ordinary people cared much less about these distinctions. In times of need they would turn to clergy, cunning-folk, or even suspected witches depending on who seemed most willing and able to provide the occult service they wanted. 68 They were by no means ignorant or dismissive of the categories their religious leaders tried to frame, and they would not have regarded clerics or even cunning-folk as equivalent figures to witches, but they recognized that all of them operated in related realms of power. 69 They also recognized that these realms of power were open to them as well through whatever spells, charms, blessings, or other apotropaic practices their particular communities traditionally sanctioned. Upper-echelon clerical leaders, for their part, feared that this was an area in which local clergymen all too frequently participated. When jurists or theologians penned criticisms of superstitious magical practices that they feared were rampant in Christian society in the late medieval period, for example, they often saw poorly educated parish clergy as being as much at fault as the laity. 70 Could these long-standing and locally sanctioned systems for engaging with occult powers have provided a level of trust that mitigated concern about witchcraft and precluded the need for significant and sustained violence against suspected witches, fitting at least the basic parameters of Thomas's argument?
Scholars have long known that witch trials of any scale emerged only very late in the medieval period. 71 Much ink has been spilled as to why this development should have been so slow in coming, given that Christianity had always categorized harmful magic (maleficium) as demonic and that there existed a clear biblical instruction that ''thou shalt not suffer a witch to live. '' 72 Some scholars, including myself, have argued that one factor was the rise of powerful movements for religious reform calling for moral and spiritual revitalization across Christian society in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries and condemning many traditional practices. 73 Here is how those movements might be read in light of Geschiere. Beginning in the 1300s and especially in the 1400s, zealous reforming preachers descend on localities across Europe bearing the message that the rites and rituals people had long used to heal harms done to them and to protect themselves from occult attack-most of which drew on elements of prayer, the liturgy, or blessed items, and which had probably received some degree of sanction from local clergy-were in fact dreadful superstitions. This would have destroyed the ''trust'' that for centuries had kept the fear of harmful witches in some degree of check.
The same basic dynamic would have continued during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, since throughout the great age of religious reform and confessionalism, all varieties of Christianity in Western Europe were obsessed with purifying their own practices and more thoroughly Christianizing their flocks. This meant sustained campaigns against witchcraft itself, but also against the array of ambiguous practices that often served as a means of protection against witches and that were now harshly criticized as superstitious.
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Not so much magisterial Protestantism and its theological maneuvers against the perceived ''magic of the medieval church,'' as Thomas framed it, but rather fervent reformers of all Christian confessions seeking to oppose witchcraft and inspire greater piety would have removed the stable, reliable, trustworthy structures that helped to reduce fear of witches. They would have acted rather like current devout Pentecostals who vehemently oppose witchcraft (or religious systems like Candomblé that they unequivocally equate with witchcraft) in Africa and Latin America, with much the same results.
Geschiere compares modern Pentecostals in Africa (as well as zealous Islamic groups) to the Christian authorities who promoted witch trials in early modern Europe. Both, in his analysis, attempt to solve the problem of (dis)trust that undergirds fear of witches by completely eliminating ambiguities of practice, declaring all forms of engagement with occult power to be diabolical. 75 In essence, they seek to promote a strict separation of religion from magic rather than allowing for a softer division that might give a degree of ''religious'' sanction to certain aspects of a fluid and ambiguous ''magical'' system, such as he thinks Candomblé accomplishes in Brazil, and as I have suggested the de facto acceptance of a range of ''superstitious'' practices by at least lower level clergy may have accomplished in medieval Europe. The parallels are, of course, not perfect. Geschiere sees early modern Christianity elevating witchcraft completely out of the local level, framing it instead ''in the context of a cosmic battle'' between God and the Devil. 76 Modern Pentecostals, on the other hand, link witchcraft firmly to the Devil but then ''mostly continue somewhat paradoxically to locate this evil in the microworld of family and village-thus reaffirming basic tenets of people's ideas about witchcraft. '' 77 Here I think Geschiere succumbs to a slightly outmoded view of European witchcraft. There was actually significant resistance to elevating witchcraft from the local to the cosmic scale during the early modern period. Accusations almost always originated with charges of maleficium, not satanic conspiracies, and even demonologists could exhibit considerable skepticism about the major feature of ''cosmic-level'' witchcraft, namely, the horrific diabolical gatherings of witches at sabbaths. 78 So the parallels between premodern Europe and modern Africa may be even closer than he suggests. But this is to some extent beside the point, because perfect congruence is not necessary for valuable comparison. * * * Throughout Witchcraft, Intimacy, and Trust, Geschiere makes a number of important points supporting broader comparisons of various sets of beliefs and practices around the globe that can, with some difficulties but not without justification, be labeled witchcraft. He helps to cut the Gordian knot of whether witch (or sorcière, or bruja) is a first-or second-order term by suggesting that it is inescapably both. 79 He also sensibly dispatches a number of problems pertaining to terms and definitions by stressing the inherent ambiguity of witchcraft, in any language. His use of intimacy as a field in which to contain witchcraft is itself highly fluid but seems to provide a sensible structure in many contexts. In particular, he shows how Europe can fit into a comparative framework, not as a special model that must be privileged or as a strange exception that must be ignored, but as one province (albeit that it my word, not his) in a worldwide empire of witchcraft.
The notion of trust is, if anything, even more ephemeral, but Geschiere's suggestion that it is a key factor mitigating fear of witches in any society, or prompting increased anxieties when it falters or fails, has great merit. One of the greatest challenges scholars of witchcraft face is to explain why concern about witches can fluctuate so dramatically. Sometimes the notion of witchcraft can appear almost ''tame'' and ''domesticated,'' serving useful social functions, but it can also provoke terrible violence against those suspected of practicing it. 80 At one time, Europe was thought to represent the terror and Africa the tame. Now we are much more attuned to those periods-before, after, and even during the era of the major witch hunts-when Europe did not persecute suspected witches with such terrible vehemence. Meanwhile rising levels of violence against witches in many parts of Africa have exploded the notion that witchcraft is a functional part of a well-ordered society.
Geschiere ends Witchcraft, Intimacy, and Trust with a pleasing irony, that perhaps a clearer understanding of the basic ambiguities of intimacy might help to relativize the ''cogency that witchcraft fears acquire in certain times and places.'' In other words, if people can learn to accept that close human relations always carry risks and create some degree of danger, they might then feel less need ''to evoke the imaginary of witchcraft with all its horrors'' in response to tensions that arise from these dynamics. 81 We can only hope.
